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Depression for the Development 
of the International 
Monetary System 
Michael D. Bordo and Barry Eichengreen 
Understanding the impact of the Great Depression on the development of the 
international monetary system requires one to ask the counterfactual question: 
What would the world have been like had the Depression not occurred? In this 
paper we speculate about the evolution of the international monetary system 
in the last two-thirds of the twentieth century absent the Great Depression but 
present the major postdepression political and economic upheavals: World War 
I1 and the cold war.' 
We argue that without the depression the gold exchange standard would have 
persisted until the outbreak of World War 11.  It would have been suspended 
during the war and for a period of postwar reconstruction before being restored 
in the first half of the 1950s. The Bretton Woods Conference would not have 
taken place, nor would a Bretton Woods system of pegged but adjustable ex- 
change rates and restrictions on capital account convertibility have been estab- 
lished. Instead, an unreformed gold exchange standard of  pegged exchange 
rates and unlimited international capital mobility would have been restored 
after World War 11. 
But this gold exchange standard would have collapsed even earlier than was 
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1. Alternatively, one might argue that these political upheavals would not have themselves oc- 
curred had they not been preceded by the depression. Here we ignore this more complicated count- 
erfactual. 
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actually the case with Bretton Woods. The move toward floating exchange rates 
that followed would have taken place well before 197  1. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 12.1 describes 
the counterfactual in more detail. Section 12.2 draws out its implications for 
the operation of the international monetary system. In section 12.3 we present 
a model of the international monetary system from 1928 to 1971 and simulate 
its implications for the determination of the world price level and the durability 
of the gold exchange standard. Section 12.4 examines the implications for eco- 
nomic growth and resource allocation of  allowing 1920s-style international 
capital mobility after World War 11.  Section 12.5 contemplates  the implications 
for institution building and international cooperation of the “no Great Depres- 
sion” scenario. Section 12.6 concludes with a summary evaluation of the im- 
pact of the depression on the international monetary system. 
12.1  Constructing the Counterfactual 
An adequate counterfactual requires not only assuming that the Great De- 
pression did not take place but also being explicit about how the macroeco- 
nomic disaster of the 1930s was averted. On the assumption that the depression 
resulted from contractionary monetary policies that were transmitted interna- 
tionally through the operation of the gold exchange standard, our counterfac- 
tual is that the disaster of the 1930s was avoided by the maintenance of stable 
monetary policies. There exist two variants of this hypothesis, both with the 
same implications for our counterfactual analysis. In one, the depression was 
precipitated by monetary events in the United States. Restrictive monetary pol- 
icies precipitated the 1929 downturn, and inept monetary policies aggravated 
the depth and duration of the slump.2  Other countries,  their monetary and credit 
conditions tied together by the fixed exchange rates of the gold exchange stan- 
dard, imported these contractionary  impulses; they too lapsed into depre~sion.~ 
The corresponding  counterfactual is that the Federal Reserve maintained a sta- 
ble monetary policy throughout the  1930s, averting the banking panics of 
1930-33,  and that the rest of  the world did not import a deflationary shock 
from the United States? 
2. Field (1984) and Hamilton (1987) show that stringent monetary conditions played an im- 
portant role in the  onset of the depression in the United States, while Friedman and Schwartz 
(1963) paint a detailed picture of the role of  monetary policy in aggraiiating the severity of the 
slump. 
3. This point is documented by Choudhri and Kochin (1980). 
4. To  the extent that bank failures would have occurred anyway, we assume that the Fed acted 
as lender of  last resort to contain their spread. For simulations of  the impact of  a stable U.S. 
monetary policy on output and the price level in the interwar period, see Bordo, Choudhri, and 
Schwartz (1995) and McCallum (1990). This scenario presumes that the Fed had the understand- 
ing and policy tools to pursue monetary  stability. Meltzer (1999, following Wheelock (1990), 
argues that Federal Reserve officials were wedded to the flawed Burgess-Riefler-Story doctrine 
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In the other variant of the hypothesis, no one country was large enough and 
no one set of national policies was sufficiently powerful to precipitate a global 
slump. Rather, the depression was induced by  the simultaneous adoption of 
inappropriately restrictive policies by several leading countries. Monetary re- 
striction in the United States, which reflected the Federal Reserve Board‘s de- 
sire to damp down the Wall Street boom, coincided with restrictive monetary 
policies in France, as the French authorities refused to accommodate the in- 
crease in money demand that followed inflation stabilization and converted 
the country’s foreign exchange reserves into gold.5 Together, contractionary 
impulses emanating from the two countries that between them held more than 
half of global gold reserves forced monetary restriction on other nations and 
depressed output and employment worldwide. The corresponding counterfac- 
tual is that the depression was averted by better, coordinated  international mon- 
etary management. The countries concerned each could have reduced their 
discount rates and initiated expansionary open market operations without de- 
stabilizing their exchange rates or the gold exchange standard. The spread of 
deflation and banking crises under the fixed-rate gold standard would have 
been contained. This would have finessed the dilemma confronting the mone- 
tary authorities, of either staying on gold and deflating or following expansion- 
ary policies and being forced off (Eichengreen 1992).  It would have prevented 
the Central European countries and the United Kingdom from being forced to 
abandon the gold standard in 193 1. 
Either way, the Great Depression would have been avoided, which is the 
starting point for our counterfactual analysis. Absent the depression, the gold 
exchange standard would have survived the 1930~.~  The devaluations of ster- 
ling in  1931, the dollar in  1933, and the franc in 1936 would not have oc- 
curred.’ 
The system then would have been suspended during World War 11,  echoing 
the experience of World War I. We assume that the same fraction of wartime 
the connection between stable money and the real economy was known at the time, as noted by 
Laidler (1994), and other central banks had on previous occasions acted successfully as lenders of 
last resort. 
5. This is the “international explanation” for the Great Depression. See Temin (1989), Eichen- 
green (1992), and Bemanke (1995). 
6. This assumes that neither the decline in primary commodity prices in the second half  of 
the 1920s nor German reparations transfers would have destabilized the exchange rates of major 
participants in the system. We provide analysis in defense of this assumption below. 
7. This assumes that other problems with the operation of the gold exchange standard would 
not have precipitated its early collapse. Potentially,  such problems included the tendency for coun- 
tries to sterilize reserve flows (to violate the “rules of  the gold standard game”), the liquidity 
problem (caused by  insufficiently elastic supplies of  gold and foreign exchange reserves), the 
confidence problem (caused by central banks’ wholesale liquidation of foreign exchange), and the 
failure of international cooperation in support of currencies in distress (Eichengreen 1990; Bordo 
1993).  We argue that none of these problems would have brought down the gold exchange standard 
in the 1930s and show that, absent the Great Depression,  this assumption is reasonable. 406  Michael D. Bordo and Barry Eichengreen 
expenditures would have been financed with inflation as actually was the case, 
so that the inflation rate in the United States, Britain, and other major countries 
would have been roughly the same as that actually observed. 
After the war the United States would have moved to restore the gold stan- 
dard at the prewar parity (the prewar gold price of $20.67). It would have done 
so because this strategy had produced relatively satisfactory  results after World 
War I. It would have been joined by the major continental European countries, 
since their experience with the interwar gold standard, to which they had re- 
turned (at devalued parities) following the inflation of the early 1920s, would 
have been broadly satisfactory in the absence of the depression.* 
The distribution of the monetary gold stock would have been similar to what 
it was; the United States would have held the lion's share. While the increase 
in U.S. gold holdings that resulted from the 1933-34  devaluation of the dollar 
would not have occurred, there still would have been gold flows to the United 
States as a result of political uncertainty in E~rope.~  And even if the European 
Allies had retained more gold in  1939, they  would have used more of it to 
purchase war mattriel from the United States following the outbreak of hostili- 
ties. The implication is that the dollar shortage that plagued postwar Europe 
would have been little different in the absence of the Great Depression.'O The 
Marshall Plan and other postwar aid still would have been needed. 
Assuming that resumption would have occurred in the first half of the 1950s 
with the U.S. price of  gold at $20.67 and other currencies realigned as they 
were with respect to the dollar, countries other than the United States would 
have had to deflate in order to acquire the reserves needed to restore convert- 
ibility. Given the lessons learned from the 1920-21  deflation, there is reason 
to think that there would have been resistance to a very radical deflation like 
8. Of the major countries, only Britain might have dissented. Although the 1931 devaluation of 
sterling would not have occurred under our counterfactual, the high unemployment of the 1920s 
would. We  assume that unemployment would have persisted  at approximately the same rate in 
the 1930s. Combined with the loss of reserves and the obligations to the United States and the 
Commonwealth incurred during World War 11,  this would have led Britain to resist returning to 
the gold exchange standard at the prewar parity a second time. Instead, Britain would have deval- 
ued the pound to approximately its 1949 level. An alternative assumption is that Britain would 
have floated the pound in response to these difficulties. Against it one might argue that British 
policymakers were unwiIIing to countenance floating after World War II (the possibility was re- 
jected in the context of the ROBOT Plan in 1952) and that they would have been even less willing 
to contemplate such radical measures absent the experience of the Great Depression. On the other 
hand, one might conjecture that absent the perceived problems with floating exchange rates in the 
1930s, policymakers would have been more willing to toy with the idea of floating after World 
War 11. Our own view is that contemporary perceptions of the operation of  floating exchange rates 
in the 1930s  were heavily conditioned by the instability and unsatisfactory performance of floating 
in the first half of the 1920s (Eichengreen  1992). The interlude of  floating in the early  1920s 
would still have occurred under our counterfactual; hence, we assume that there would have been 
a continued aversion to floating after World War II. 
9. Romer (1993) ascribes the largest part of the gold and capital flows from Europe to the United 
States in the second half of the 1930s to politically motivated capital flight. 
10. For a sampling of writings on the dollar shortage, see Balogh (1946), Williams (1952), and 
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that of  1920-21.  The 1920-21  deflation had caused severe dislocations: with 
the decline of wage indexation in Britain (the “sliding scale agreements”-see 
Thomas 1994) and, more generally, the increasingly structured nature of labor 
markets after World War 11, a repeat of that experience would have given rise 
to even higher levels of unemployment, something that powerful trade unions 
would have been unwilling to accept.” The only way  the system could then 
have been resurrected would have been for the United States to provide suffi- 
cient liquidity to enable the European countries to restore convertibility at the 
somewhat higher level that prices had scaled.’* 
In this case and assuming that actual and counterfactual world money sup- 
plies were the same, the United States would have had to transfer $26 billion 
to its trading partners, almost double what it provided under the Marshall Plan, 
to permit the gold exchange standard to be reestablished in the early 1950s. 
This might seem like a pipe dream, given the opposition that existed in the 
U.S. Congress to the Marshall Plan, but if we add to Marshall Plan transfers 
the Anglo-American loan of  1945 and the U.S. quota in the International Mon- 
etary Fund (since we will argue that this last institution would not have existed 
in the absence of the Great Depression), we get a total that equals the liquidity 
required to restart the global gold exchange standard in the early 1950s. Given 
the imperatives of the cold war, which would have remained under our count- 
erfactual, a transfer of this magnitude is not impla~sib1e.l~ 
12.2  Implications of the Counterfactual 
Assuming that the major countries all resumed current and capital account 
convertibility in the early 1950s and that other significant provisions of  the 
gold exchange standard were maintained, the post-World  War I1 international 
monetary system would have differed from that which actually prevailed in 
four important respects. 
12.2.1  The Bretton Woods Institutions 
It follows from our counterfactual  that the Bretton Woods Conference would 
not have been convened. Most of the problems of concern to its participants 
would not have arisen in the absence of the depression: these include bilater- 
11. Eichengreen (1992, chap. 3) discusses the macroeconomic  effects of the 1920-21 deflation. 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1996) discuss the literature, suggesting a decline in wage and price 
flexibility after World War II. 
12. Eichengreen (1993) concludes that this transfer was not necessary because it assumes the 
maintenance of capital controls, which limited the impact of shocks on the balance of payments 
and hence the need for reserves. 
13. This, of course, is only one of several more or less equally plausible assumptions.  Readers 
for whom this stretches credulity will want to refer to model D below, where we undertake  a 
sensitivity analysis of this assumption,  assuming that the world instead  initiated a radical deflation 
after World War  II, implying that the post-World  War II world started off with a money supply 
some 45 percent below the actual, obviating the need to increase the magnitude of the Marshall 
Plan to get the gold exchange standard restarted. 408  Michael D. Bordo and Barry Eichengreen 
alism, exchange controls, competitive devaluations, destabilizing speculation, 
hot money flows, and the international transmission of deflation. 
There would thus have been no International Monetary Fund (IMF) to pro- 
vide surveillance and conditional assistance and to supplement other sources 
of international reserves. Cooperation and policy coordination would been ar- 
ranged directly among the major powers as in the 1920s. Governments would 
have found it difficult to resort to parity changes in the event of balance-of- 
payments problems, as authorized by  the IMF Articles of Agreement in the 
event of fundamental di~equilibrium.’~  And there would have existed no sys- 
temwide controls on capital flows. This would have made it more difficult for 
countries to follow independent monetary and fiscal policies. 
12.2.2  The Supply and Demand for Reserves 
Because post-World  War I1 central banks would have been bound by  na- 
tional convertibility statutes, which required them to back their liabilities with 
gold and (often, limited amounts of) foreign exchange, gold would have been 
a  more important component of  international reserves than  under Bretton 
Woods. The world demand for monetary gold would have been greater than 
was the case in fact. But the supply would have been different too. Gold pro- 
duction would have been less between 1929 and 1933 because, with less defla- 
tion, the relative price of gold would have been lower, and the new flow supply 
would have  been 1e~s.l~  Production would have  risen  at best  slowly in  the 
193Os, as it had in the 192Os, reflecting improvements in mining technology. It 
would have fallen during World War 11,  as it did in the latter stages of World 
War  I, reflecting paper-money-induced  inflation and governments’ efforts to 
limit exchange rate fluctuations.16  These changes would have reduced the world 
monetary gold stock in the postwar period below what it actually was. 
As a result, there would have been an even greater demand for foreign ex- 
change to supplement gold as international reserves. Most of that additional 
14. In contrast, this practice was uncommon under the gold exchange standard of  the  1920s. 
Eichengreen (1995) discusses why this “escape clause” provision, which had also been invoked 
(in the form of  temporary suspensions of convertibility followed by resumption  at the previous 
rate) under the pre-World  War I gold standard (see Bordo and Kydland 1995) had become increas- 
ingly difficult to invoke under the reconstructed gold standard of the 1920s. 
15. Production also would have been less after 1933 because the United States would not have 
raised the nominal gold price from $20.67 to $35.00 per ounce. 
16. Fiat money inflation would normally be expected to raise the nominal price of gold and the 
prices of other commodities commensurately, with no implications for the real price of gold. Dur- 
ing World War I, however, European governments sought to peg their currencies to gold and the 
dollar at only slightly depreciated rates; they prevented the price of gold from rising at the same 
rate as other commodity prices, eroding the incentive to devote resources to its production. And 
the United States maintained  the $20.67 peg through the war (with the exception of  the gold 
embargo of  1917-19).  Our assumption is that broadly similar policies would have been pursued 
during World War II, especially since the United States never abandoned the $35.00 per ounce peg 
and the Tripartite Agreement of  1936  attempted to stabilize the franc and the pound. In addition, in 
the face of less deflation, the nonmonetary gold stock would have increased relative to the mone- 
tary gold stock in the 1930s and more so during the World War I1 inflation. 409  The Great Depression and the International Monetary System 
demand would have been met by  dollars rather than sterling, since Britain’s 
post-World  War 11  economic difficulties would not have been any less severe 
and governments would have been reluctant to hold the currency of a country 
in dire straits. The stock of dollars held as official foreign balances would have 
grown more quickly than was actually the case.” This would have pushed the 
world toward a dollar standard in which the United States as center country 
held gold as its reserves and the rest of the world held dollars. For political 
reasons, however, a number of countries would have resisted giving up their 
gold reserves and going onto a dollar standard. They would have likely precipi- 
tated its collapse even sooner than was actually the case.18 
12.2.3  The Capacity for Adjustment and Intervention 
The reconstructed gold exchange standard would have been free of restric- 
tions on capital movements, as had been the case before World War I and in 
the 192Os.I9  Countries therefore would have faced an even tougher balance-of- 
payments constraint than under Bretton Woods. Sterilized intervention would 
have been the only instrument available for insulating economies from the poli- 
cies required for the maintenance of  external balance. The same evidence that 
suggests that  sterilized intervention has  offered governments only limited 
room for maneuver in the high-capital-mobility environment of recent decades 
suggests that this would have been true after World War I1 under our count- 
erfactual.*O 
Under Bretton Woods, countries could alter parities in response to a funda- 
mental disequilibrium. In the counterfactual this is no longer the case. The 
only channel of adjustment for deficit countries (other than breaking the link 
to gold) would have been deflation and, in the face of sticky wages and prices, 
17. This assumes that countries had been able to acquire these balances at the desired rate. As 
explained above, this  would have required that the Marshall Plan transfer to the European countries 
to have been larger than the $13 billion granted. 
18. Had the price of gold been increased afrer World War II, as was suggested in the 1960s by 
Jacques Rueff, among others, then the pressure would have been less and the ultimate collapse 
would have been later. But we think that there were good reasons why schemes to adjust the 
domestic price of gold under a gold-exchange-standard-like  system were problematic.  An altema- 
tive point of view (advocated by,  inter aha, Meltzer 1991 and McKinnon 1969) is that had the 
United States continued to follow stable money policies, the rest of the world would have been 
willing to continue to use dollars as international reserves instead of  gold. The gold exchange 
standard would have evolved into the kind of dollar standard advocated in the Bretton Woods era 
by McKinnon and others. We argue below, however, that historical factors grounded in countries’ 
earlier experiences with the operation of the gold standard rendered this outcome unlikely. 
19. In addition, the IMF  would not have been present to advance liquidity to countries facing 
balance-of-payments  difficulties, as already noted. 
20. Evidence for the interwar period based on offset coefficients (Kwiecinska-Kalita 1996) 
similarly suggests that most countries (other than the United States) had very little leeway for 
independent monetary policy action. The evidence for the Bretton Woods period, when capital 
controls were pervasive, stands in contrast: Kouri and Porter (1974) and Obstfeld (1982), among 
others, demonstrate a role for sterilized intervention for the major European countries. Pasula 
(1994, 1996), in contrast, finds that the offset to monetary policy under Bretton Woods was com- 
plete. 410  Michael D. Bordo and Barry Eichengreen 
depression. This would have  created pressure to break with gold in favor of 
greater exchange rate flexibility. 
12.2.4 
Absent the capital controls of the Bretton Woods system, the reintegration 
of world capital markets would have occurred more rapidly. Resource alloca- 
tion would have been better, accelerating growth and convergence in countries 
that started the postwar period with real incomes below that of  the United 
States. 
How much faster convergence would have been and what countries would 
have benefited is unclear, however. Abramovitz (1989) and Wolf  (1995) show 
that there was already rapid convergence among the high-income countries, 
notwithstanding low levels of  international capital mobility. It could be that 
other channels, including international trade and technology transfer, transmit- 
ted to the members of the “convergence club” the main gains from openness. 
At  the same time, Saint-Paul (1995) suggests that Europe and Japan would 
have grown even faster had international financial liberalization allowed them 
to more quickly augment their capital stocks. Sachs and Warner (1995), on the 
other hand, can be read as suggesting that the main benefits from financial 
liberalization would have accrued not to the high-income countries that were 
already members of the convergence club but to low-income developing coun- 
tries less able to import expertise through other channels. 
The Efficiency of Resource Allocation 
12.3  The Gold Exchange Standard, 1925-60 
In this section we  develop a model of  the gold exchange standard on the 
assumption that, rather than collapsing during the Great Depression, it contin- 
ued operating until the outbreak of World War I1 and was reestablished follow- 
ing the conclusion of hostilities. 
We extend a generic model of the gold standard to incorporate some special 
features of interwar monetary arrangements. In calibration we use data for a 
composite of 21 countries that account for 75 percent of the world monetary 
gold stock and a comparable share of economic activity in 1928. 
12.3.1  The Model 
A simulation model of  the global gold standard was developed by  Bordo 
and Ellson (1983, building on the theoretical model in Barro (1979). The 
model contains a money market and a gold market. The former determines the 
world price level, given the world monetary gold stock determined in the latter. 
The gold market takes the price of gold as fixed by the authorities and, given 
the price level from the money market, determines the real price of gold and 
the world monetary gold stock. 
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(1)  Ms  = XP,G,, 
where M" is the world money supply in dollars, X is the money-gold multiplier 
(the ratio of currency plus deposits to the monetary gold stock),  pG is the fixed 
nominal price of an ounce of gold, and G, is the world monetary gold stock 
(in ounces). 
Equations (2a) and (2b) are two variants of the income velocity of circula- 
tion. Equation (2a) assumes that velocity is a logarithmic function of the nomi- 
nal interest rate:*l 
(24  v =  Via. 
Equation (2b), following Bordo and Jonung (1987), takes trend velocity as a 
function of institutional factors that evolve at a rate p: 
(2b)  v =  Vewr. 
The nominal interest rate is 
(3)  i=r+n, 
where r is the real rate of interest and ~r is the expected rate of change of the 
price level. Following Mundell(l970) the real interest rate depends negatively 
on expected inflation: 
(4)  r  = F - an. 
We  assume perfect foresight so that actual and expected inflation are equal:22 
(5) 
Money market equilibrium requires 
(6)  P = XVP,G,Jy. 
Given 1,  PG,  perfect foresight, and an exogenous level of output, y, the price 
level is determined by the monetary gold stock. 
Equations (7) to (9) determine the gold market equilibrium and, together 
with equations (1) to (6),  the money supply and the price level. Gold produc- 
tion is characterized by increasing costs; the supply of new gold is 
(7)  g  = gcbeYt, 
Tr  = (r: - &)Jr:-*, 
21. We  depart from Barro (1979),  who assumes a constant real interest rate and makes the 
demand for money a function of  the expected rate of  change in the price level. But following 
Barro, eqs. (2a) and (2b) assume the real income and price elasticities of real money demand to 
be one. 
22. Bordo and Ellson (1985) also use an adaptive expectations scheme. In their simulations,  the 
adjustment path of the model differed under the two schemes but the long-run equilibrium values 
of the endogenous variables are of course unaffected. 412  Michael D. Bordo and Barry Eichengreen 
where g is gold production, P, is the real price of  gold (P,/P),  and y is the 
exogenous rate of  technological progress in the mining  The flow 
demand for nonmonetary gold is 
(8)  6,  = (E  + S)(G,Y - G,) , 
where G,  is the net change in the nonmonetary gold stock, G,* is the target 
stock of nonmonetary gold, and G, is the actual stock. G,* is defined as 
G,Y = C p-0  Ti-+ , 
NgY 
E is a partial adjustment factor, and S is the depreciation rate or normal replace- 
ment flow. 
Since the monetary authorities maintain a fixed price of gold, the change in 
the monetary gold stock is 
(9)  G,  = g - GN, 
where GM  is the net change in the monetary gold stock. Taking logs, and solv- 
ing equations  (1)  to  (9) simultaneously, steady state solutions in terms of 
growth rates are 
P=G  M  =GN=O. 
This implies g = g,*: that, in equilibrium, gold production equals the deprecia- 
tion rate multiplied by the desired nonmonetary gold 
12.3.2  Incorporating the Gold Exchange Standard 
A key difference between the gold standard and the gold exchange standard 
is A,  the money-gold multiplier. After World War  I, most nations adopted a 
form of gold exchange standard in which foreign bonds and bills of exchange 
supplemented monetary gold stocks. To  capture this feature of  the gold ex- 
change standard, we decompose  A  into the ratio of  broad money  to high- 
powered money (MIH),  the ratio of high-powered money to gold and foreign 
exchange reserves (HIR),  and the ratio of international reserves to gold (RIG) 
(Bernanke 1995). MIH depends on the development of  the banking system, 
while HIR is determined by  sterilization policies and by the laws specifying 
gold backing for liabilities; in the United States, for example, the Federal Re- 
serve before 1945 had a gold cover requirement of 40 percent against notes 
and 35 percent against deposits, which implied a minimum value for HIR of 
23. Barro does not account for technological progress but discusses the implications of incorpo- 
rating it. We assume that technological progress is exogenous. In fact, there is evidence that major 
technological changes in the gold industry were both induced and exogenous (Rockoff 1984). 
24. While Bordo and Ellson (1985) account for the fact that gold is a durable exhaustible re- 
source, we eliminate this aspect of the model to simplify the analysis. Our hypothetical gold stan- 
dard will exhibit less deflation than if we accounted for depletion. 413  The Great Depression and the International Monetary System 
2.63. RIG reflects the substitution of foreign exchange for gold. For the center 
countries of the interwar gold standard, the United States and the United King- 
dom, RIG = 1. The same is true of the United States after World War 11. 
Figure 12.1A shows the evolution of the three ratios from 1925 for our ag- 
gregate of  21 countries.z5  MIH is stable prior to the onset of  the depression, 
when it declines in response to the global banking crisis. HIR begins falling 
with the establishment of the gold exchange standard in 1925, reflecting steril- 
ization policies in the United States and France. RIG rises up to the onset of 
the depression, reflecting the substitution of foreign exchange for gold by par- 
ticipating countries. It then declines as the participants, fearing speculative at- 
tacks on the reserve currencies, converted their foreign exchange to gold. 
The multiplier A can be broken into two components: 
M  MH 
R  HR 
A(1)  = -  = -- 
and 
R  A(2)  = - 
G 
12.3.3  The Distribution of Gold 
The adequacy of the global supply of  monetary gold and its distribution 
between deficit and surplus countries dominated discussions of  the interwar 
gold exchange standard and the Bretton Woods system. The first concern is 
readily addressed using our model, while addressing the second requires us to 
specify one further relationship. 
We  assume that the demand for reserves by the center country(ies) and the 
rest of  the world depends on levels of  economic activity, a measure of the 
opportunity cost of holding reserves, and factors such as their openness (see 
Eichengreen 1990). The center country(ies)  holds only gold reserves, while the 
rest of the world holds both gold and foreign exchange, with the breakdown 
between the two determined by  the return on short-term foreign assets and 
legal gold cover requirements. We  assume that the center country's share of 
total reserves (and of the world monetary gold stock) paralleled the evolution 
of the share of its output in the world's  total. 
12.3.4  Simulating the Model 
Table  12.1 lists the parameters used in the simulation.26  Table  12.2 shows 
the initial values and data definitions. We developed world aggregates for the 
endogenous variables (money supply, monetary base, international reserves, 
25. Complete data for our 21 countries are not available after 1935. 
26. The elasticities in  the  gold market  equations are  derived from regression estimates using 
data for the period 1880-1928.  In the sensitivity analysis reported below we also used elasticities 
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in the text. 
Ratios for the world, 1925-35  (A) and 1950-51  (B) 415  The Great Depression and the International Monetary System 
Table 12.1  Parameters of the Simulated  Models 
A. 1928-38  B. 1950-71 
C. Gold Commission 
Elasticities 
- 
V = 2.26 
a = 0.25 
g = 3.31 
(Y = 0.5 
f3 = 0.6 
0 = 0.3 
q = 0.7 
K = (q; -  q:)  y = 0.133*0.0394 
A(  1) =  = 8.5 
A(2) = (WG),,,,e"';  (WG),928  = 1.3 
+ = 0.03 
r = 0.045 
p = -0.026 
y = 0.018 
E = 0.5 
6 = 0.01 
- 
G, = 0.08 
- 
V=  1.65  p = 0.6 
a = 0.25 
(Y = 0.5 
G, = 0.04 
q = 0.7 
K = ($  -  9:)  y = 0.55*0.0428 
h(1) = (M/R),950  = 10.7 
h(2) = (R/G)1950eK';  (R/G)1950  = 1.2 
+ = 0.03 
7 = 0.0145 
y = 0.018 
E = 0.5 
6 = 0.01 
y = 0.03 
g  = 5.04 
fi = 0.6 
e = 0.3 
e = 1.2 
q = 1.0 
4 = 0.1  - 
= 0.00285 
Source: Panel C from US.  Gold Commission Report (1982). 
gold reserves, price level, real income) based on data for the 21 countries con- 
sidered  in  Bordo  and  Schwartz  (1996).27 These  21 countries  account  for 
roughly 75 percent of the world monetary gold stock before World War I1 and 
85 percent thereafter, and for the vast majority of world economic activity.28 
We  construct X(l) and X(2)  assuming that the shares of the 21 countries in 
world gold and international reserves remained constant after two benchmark 
years (1928 and 1950) for which world data are a~ailable.~~  This allows us to 
connect the data for our 21 countries to the world gold market totals in the US. 
Gold Commission Report (1982).30 
We  simulate the model over the period 1929-38 on the assumption that the 
27. The countries are United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Japan, Italy, Canada, 
Netherlands,  Belgium, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland,  Greece, 
Australia,  Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. 
28. For the postwar period, we dropped the three Latin American countries from the sample 
because they followed unstable monetary and exchange rate policies atypical  of the Bretton Woods 
experience and no longer played a significant role in the international  monetary system. 
29. Whenever we refer to 21 countries, we should be understood as meaning 18 countries (ex- 
cluding the three Latin Americans) after World War II. We also adjusted the world monetary gold 
stock series taken from League of Nations (1931), which ends in 1931, to the series world central 
bank gold reserves from the US.  Gold Commission Report (1982), which extends from 1913 to 
1980. The two series became virtually identical after the United States nationalized private gold 
holdings in 1934. 
30. We  used U.S.  interest rates as representative of  the world and assumed US. total factor 
productivity growth (y) as representative  of technological  progress in world gold production. 416  Michael D. Bordo and Barry Eichengreen 
Table 12.2  Initial Values and Definitions of Variables 
Initial Value  Definition 
P,  = 20 
P=  1 
y=  191 
MS = 85 
H = 23 
R=  10 
G, = 7.7 
G, = 535 
G, = 489 
g = 20 
V = 2.26 
i = 0.045 
P, = 20 (20) 
P = 1.51 (1.61) 
y = 276 (351) 
MS  = 254 (317) 
H = 64  (81) 
R = 24 (25) 
G, = 19 (20) 
G, = 917 (928) 
G, = 566 (605) 
g = 24 (24) 
V = 1.65 (1.87) 
i = 0.0145 (0.0252) 
A. 1928-38 
Price of gold; dollars per ounce. 
World price index: weighted sum of 21 countries’ GNP deflators 
1928 = 1, weights = shares of each country’s GNP in total GNP in 
current dollars. 
World output; billion dollars. Sum of 21 countries’ real GNP in current 
dollars, it is assumed to grow at approximately 3.9 percent, the 
growth rate in 1921-28. 
deposits), sum of 21 countries in current dollars. 
current dollars. 
reserves): sum of  21 countries in current dollars 
Money supply; billion dollars. M2 definition (currency plus total 
High-powered money (currency plus reserves): sum of 21 countries in 
International reserves (central bank gold reserves plus foreign exchange 
Central hank gold reserves: sum of 21 countries in current dollars. 
World monetary gold stock; millions of ounces. 
World nonmonetary gold stock; millions of ounces. 
World gold production first period; millions of  ounces. 
World velocity in 1928. 
US.  nominal interest rate in 1928 (short-term commercial paper rate). 
Fixed price of gold; dollars per ounce. 
World price index: weighted sum of  18 countries’ GNP deflators 
B. 1950-71  (1953-71) 
1928 = 1, weights = shares of  each country’s GNP in total GNP in 
current dollars. 
dollars, it is assumed to grow at approximately 4.3 percent, the 
growth rate in 1950-71. 
deposits), sum of 18 countries in current dollars. 
current dollars. 
ounce plus foreign exchange reserves less reserve position in IMF 
plus IMF quota), sum of  18 countries in current dollars. 
current dollars. 
World output; billion dollars. Sum of  18 countries’ real GNP in current 
Money supply; billion dollars. M2 definition (currency plus total 
High-powered money (currency plus reserves): sum of 18 countries in 
International reserves (central bank gold reserves valued at $20 per 
Central bank  gold reserves plus IMF quota: sum of 21 countries in 
World monetary gold stock; millions of ounces. 
World nonmonetary gold stock; millions of ounces. 
World gold production first period; millions of  ounces. 
World velocity in 1950. 
U.S. nominal interest rate in 1950 (short-term commercial paper rate). 
arrangements in place in the second half of the 1920s were not interrupted by 
the depression. We assume that the system was then suspended with the onset 
of World War I1 (as it had been following the outbreak of World War I). 
In the period 1939-49,  we treat the world as on a fiat monetary standard- 
that is, as if central banks closed their gold windows. Our first counterfactual 417  The Great Depression and the International Monetary System 
Table 12.3  Assumptions  behind the Simulated Models 
Model  Assumptions 
Model A: benchmark 
Model B: Velocity trends 
Model C: Velocity as function of 
Model D: Post-World  War II 
nominal interest rate 
resumption similar to 
post-World  War I 
Model E: Sensitivity analysis of 
model A using postwar gold 
market elasticities 
Model F: Sensitivity analysis of 
model A with the postwar gold 
exchange standard 
1.  Constant  velocity  at  average  level  of  1921-28 for 
interwar simulation; 1950  level for postwar simulation 
2. Ratio of world money supply to international reserves 
(h(1))  fixed at 1928  level for interwar simulation; 1950 
level for postwar simulation 
3.  Ratio of international reserves to gold (X(2)), a function 
of  the difference  between the income elasticities  of 
demand for total international reserves and the demand 
for gold reserves (0.133  interwar; 0.55 postwar) times 
the trend growth rate of world real income (3.9  percent 
interwar; 4.4  percent postwar) 
4.  Gold  market  elasticities  (p,  8,  q, +),  based  on 
regressions for the period 1880-1928 
5. Real output and total factor productivity grows at the 
1921-28 rate for interwar simulation; 1950-71 rate for 
postwar simulation 
trend in the interwar period (-2.6 percent) and rises at 
the 1950-71 trend in the postwar period (0.3  percent). 
Same as model A except velocity varies with simulated 
interwar and postwar trends in nominal interest rates. 
Same as model A except money supply and price level 
start at much lower levels in 1950. 
Same as model A except velocity declines at 1921-28 
Same as model A except for the use of postwar 
elasticities (p, 8, q. +) in the gold production and 
nonmonetary demand for gold equations. 
Same as model A except post-World  War I1 resumption 
occurs in 1953 after the Marshall Plan. 
reinstates the gold exchange standard in  1950 with the U.S.  price of gold at 
$20.67 and other currencies realigned as they were vis-A-vis the dollar.31 
Table 12.3 presents the assumptions underlying the simulations described 
below. Results are summarized in table 12.4. 
Model A is the simplest variant of  the model; it fixes velocity at its 1928 
level and allows output and total factor productivity to continue growing at 
their 1921-28  rates. The multiplier X(l),  the ratio of  world money supply to 
international reserves, is fixed at its 1928 level (see fig. 12.1A). This assumes 
that neither the United States nor France followed the restrictive monetary pol- 
31.  We choose 1950 to allow for reconstruction  and the reestablishment of  prewar financial 
relationships, and because the major devaluation of sterling and 23 other currencies in 1949,  most 
authorities believe, reestablished the pre-World  War II parities. In a simulation reported below we 
also tried 1953 as the starting period. 418  Michael D. Bordo and Barry Eichengreen 



























1950-7  1" 
1 
-1.0  -1.3  -3.3  -2.3  -  1.3  -  1.3  -1.3 
-3.7  2.6  3.2  2.9  2.6  2.6  2.6 
2.8  2.1  2.7  2.4  2.1  2.0  2.0 
1.8  2.0  1.5  1.8  2.0  2.0  2.0 
2.4  2.0  2.2  2.1  2.0  2.0  2.0 
7.0  2.6  3.8  3.2  2.6  2.6  2.6 
-22.0  -2.6  -3.4  -3.5  -2.6  -2.1  -2.1 
5.9  5.9  5.9  5.9  1.1  5.9  5.9 
2.7  2.7  2.7  2.7  2.7  2.7  2.2 
0.7  -0.3  0.0  -0.1  -0.0  -0.3  0.4 
1.9  1.4  1.6  1.5  1  .5  1.4  1.4 
-5.2  -1.6  -1.6  -1.6  1.3  -1.6  -1.6 
6.8  6.8  6.8  6.8  6.8  6.8  6.8 
-  -  -  -  -  -  - 
2.9  -0.8  -0.5  -0.9  -0.3  -1.0  -1.0 
7.1  3.4  3.5  3.7  4.0  3.3  3.2 
0.9  1.1  1.2  1.4  1.6  0.9  0.9 
3.2  2.6  2.7  2.6  2.8  3.0  2.8 
1.9  1.7  1.8  1.9  2.1  1.8  1.7 
3.4  2.3  2.1  2.8  2.0  2.8  2.8 
6.4  -2.1  -2.0  -1.0  -1.8  -1.8  -1.2 
Note: P = price level, M = money supply, MGS = monetary gold stock, NMGS = nonmonetary 
gold stock, WGS = world gold stock, g = production, and i = interest rate. 
"Model F is simulated for 1953-71  (see text). 
icies that led them to accumulate a growing share of global gold reserves and 
plunged the world economy into the depression. 
We  assume that the ratio of  reserves to gold evolved as a function of the 
difference between the income elasticities of the demand for total international 
reserves and the demand for gold reserves (equal to 0.133) multiplied by  the 
trend rate of growth of world real income, that is, 
(see fig.  12.1A).32  Based on initial values for the 21-country aggregate, we 
simulate the model to obtain the money supply, price level, gold production, 
32. These elasticities were estimated from cross-sectional  regressions using data for 24 coun- 
tries in 1929 in Eichengreen (1990). The sample includes most of the 21 countries included in our 419  The Great Depression and the International Monetary System 
world total gold stock, world nonmonetary gold stock, world monetary gold 
stock, and interest rates shown in figures 12.U-12.2F. 
For 1939-49,  the money supply process is determined not by gold supplies 
but by the exigencies of war finance. We take prices as exogenous and assume 
that they followed the actual pattern of U.S. inflation.33  World gold production 
depends on the real price of gold, which is driven by  U.S. price-level move- 
ments and productivity in the mining industry. 
For the postwar period we fix velocity and X(1)  at their 1950 levels (Fig. 
12.1B)and allow world output and U.S. total factor productivity to grow at 
their 1950-71 rates. The multiplier X(2), which depends on the difference be- 
tween the income elasticities of demand for reserves and gold in the interwar 
years, turns out to be too low to provide an equilibrium solution to the model, 
given higher postwar growth rates. We experimented with different values for 
the difference in these elasticities before settling on 0.55  as the benchmark 
case.34  (See fig. 12.1B.) 
We start our simulations in 1950  using the hypothetical world monetary gold 
stock but actual international reserves, money supplies, prices, and output. This 
assumes that the gold exchange standard was restored without a radical post- 
war deflation like that of the 1920s. 
Given a hypothetical monetary gold stock of $21 billion and actual reserves 
of $61 billion, foreign exchange reserves would have  had to be $13 billion 
larger than the actual value of $27  billion in  1950.  The United States would 
have had to double its Marshall Plan transfer of  $13 billion to get the gold 
exchange standard restarted.35 
12.3.5  Simulation Results 
Gold production increases in our simulation by less than it actually did in the 
1930s (fig. 1224).  This is because the model generates less deflation in the 
world aggregate. By using the estimates for 1929 we are therefore eliminating from our count- 
erfactual scenario the effects of the contractionary shift from gold to foreign exchange undertaken 
by the Bank of France during the depression. 
33. Adequate data for our 21-country aggregate are not available for the period of the war. We 
add simulated gold production to the 1938 simulated world gold stock and adjust for depreciation 
to obtain a new hypothetical stock. We assume that the world monetary gold stock increased from 
its hypothetical 1938 level following the actual 1939-50  trend. Given the monetary gold stock we 
then derive the nonmonetary gold stock. 
34. The difference between the income elasticities of reserves and gold based on simple ordi- 
nary least squares regressions over the 1950-71  period was 0.47. 
35. As we note above, one can imagine that the $8.8 billion of gold that member countries 
transferred to the IMF  could have been used for other purposes, reducing the increase in Marshall 
aid to slightly more than $4 billion. The Anglo-American  loan of 1945 of $3.75  billion by the 
United States and $1.5 billion by Canada as well as U.S.  loans to France and Germany together 
could have made up the difference. Interestingly, the sum of the Marshall Plan transfer plus the 
hypothetical transfer that is required to restart the gold exchange standard in our scenario just 
equals the $26 billion that Keynes advocated as necessary to start the International Clearing Union. 
Below, we undertake some sensitivity analyses, varying this assumption to see how much differ- 
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absence of  the depression and because without the  1933 devaluation of  the 
dollar the United States would not  have raised the nominal price of  gold. 
The  nonmonetary gold  stock grows faster, reflecting the fact  that  gold  is 
cheaper relative to other commodities in the absence of  deflation (see fig. 
12.28); the  world  monetary gold  stock therefore grows more  slowly  (fig. 
12.2C). M2 rises instead of falling as it did during the depression (fig. 12.20), 
and the price level (fig. 12.2E) declines at an annual rate of  1.3 percent (in 
contrast to the sharp deflation and rebound that actually occurred-see  table 
12.4). 
Gold production during World War I1 is below actual levels because the gold 
price is lower in the absence of  dollar devaluation, reducing the world gold 
stock (fig. 12.2F). The monetary gold stock follows its actual trend but starting 
from the lower simulated 1938 level. The nonmonetary gold stock, derived as 
a residual from the total stock, is also below its historical level. 
The price level evolves very differently under our hypothetical standard than 
under Bretton Woods. Simulated deflation is about 1 percent a year, compared 
to an actual annual inflation rate of 2.9 percent.36  Though the monetary gold 
stock grows rapidly in the postwar simulations and money supply expands by 
3.3 percent per annum, this growth is not rapid enough to offset the effect on 
the price level of the 4.3 percent per annum rate of output growth. 
Below we summarize the results of sensitivity analyses of our model, vary- 
ing assumptions on the behavior of velocity and using alternative resumption 
scenarios. (See tables 12.3 and  12.4 for the assumptions and results of  the 
different scenarios.) Model B assumes that M2 velocity, rather than remaining 
constant, declined in the 1930s at the same 2.6 percent trend as in 1921-28 
before rising at a rate of 0.3 percent per annum (as it did) from 1950 to 1971  .37 
This  aggravates deflation between the wars but  ameliorates it after World 
War 11. 
Model C assumes that velocity is a function of  the nominal interest rate 
(which incorporates expected  inflation  on  the  assumption of  perfect  fore- 
sight).38  This produces less of a decline in velocity in the interwar period and 
more of a decline after World War 11  (see fig. 12.3). Deflation is less than in 
model B in the interwar period and about the same as in model A in the postwar 
years (see table 12.4). 
Model D simulates the effects of deflating before restoring the gold standard 
after World War 11,  that is, repeating the patterns followed by the United King- 
dom and other countries after World War I. We  start with model A but assume 
36. The tendency for deflation to reduce the nonmonetary gold stock would have been offset by 
the growth of real income. While deflation would have stimulated gold production, the net effect 
would still have been growth in the monetary gold stock at rates below the actual. 
37. A justification for this assumption is that trends in velocity reflected the institutional factors 
documented by Bordo and Jonung (1987, 1990). 
38. We  use the U.S. three-month commercial paper rate to proxy for the nominal interest rate. 
To  avoid difficulties encountered in making the model converge we initially solved model A for 
the price level, substituted it into eqs. (4)  to (6) and then solved for velocity. We then substituted 
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Fig. 12.3  Underlying velocity trends in models A, B, and C 
that when World War LI ended the United States deflated vigorously to restore 
the price level to its 1938 level and other countries did likewise. Rather than 
allowing international liquidity to increase by $13 billion by  1950, we assume 
that monetary authorities maintained international reserves at their actual lev- 
els in relation to gold reserves in 1950 and that money supplies were kept in 
the same proportion to reserves as actually prevailed. This implies a money 
supply 45 percent below the actual.39 
Finally, we test for sensitivity to alternative gold market elasticities. In place 
of elasticities based on pre-Great Depression data, we use elasticities from the 
US. Gold Commission Report (1  982) based on data €or the postwar period. 
Postwar gold production and nonmonetary gold demand functions are some- 
what more elastic than their prewar counterparts (see table 12.2),  but simula- 
tions in model E produce patterns for the endogenous variables not that differ- 
ent from those in the benchmark model A (see table 12.4).40 
39. Although money supplies and price levels start out below those of model A (fig. 12.4),  the 
lower price level stimulates gold production and increases the nonmonetary gold stock. The net 
effect would have been to raise the monetary gold stock. This would have produced a path for the 
price level not dissimilar from that of model A. 
40.  This reinforces our belief in the robustness of  the model. We tried some additional experi- 
ments. Instead of using the postwar gold market elasticities from the U.S. Gold Commission  Report 
(1982). we estimated our own, using the 18-country data set. The elasticities and simulations  were 
quite similar to those reported here. Second, we ran the simulations using the pre-Great Depres- 
sion elasticities for the interwar period and our postwar elasticities for the postwar period. Again 
the model was robust. We regard the simulations based on pre-Great Depression data as closest 
to the spirit of our counterfactual scenario, on the grounds that, had the gold exchange standard 
been preserved, the structure of the gold market would not have changed dramatically. 424  Michael D. Bordo and Barry Eichengreen 
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Fig. 12.4  Actual and simulated (A) money supply and (B)  prices, model D 
12.3.6 
We  now address two key questions about the operation of the hypothetical 
gold exchange standard. We  ask whether there would have existed adequate 
gold reserves in the 1930s and how the Triffin dilemma would have played 
itself out after World War 11. 
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Fig. 12.5  Actual and  simulated G/H for the world, 1928-38 
Note: For 1936-38  data were available for only a limited number of countries. 
The first “Interim Report of the Gold Delegation” (League of Nations 1930) 
devoted considerable attention to whether there would be enough gold to allow 
the system to operate for another decade. The league’s experts warned of a gold 
shortage but observed that it could be ameliorated by  policies to encourage 
governments and central banks to economize on use of precious metal. 
We address this question by comparing ratios of gold reserves to the mone- 
tary base obtained from simulations with the league’s estimates of the legal 
minimum ratio mandated by gold standard statutes?’ Figure 12.5 plots the 
counterfactual reserve ratio for model A, along with the actual ratio and the 
minimum legal ratio of 31.7 percent. While the actual ratio rose in the 1930s 
(reflecting the collapse of price levels and the rise in the real price of gold), the 
simulated ratio declines slightly but never approaches the legal minimum be- 
fore World War 11.  These simulations suggest that a gold shortage would not 
have been an  insurmountable obstacle to the persistence of the system. 
Even had this interwar problem been surmounted,  Triffin (1947) warned that 
there would be insufficient gold to finance the growth of world output and trade 
in the postwar period. The substitution of foreign exchange, primarily dollars, 
for gold might postpone the problem, but as foreign dollar holdings increased 
41. League of Nations (1930, annex  13, table 5, p. 96). To  calculate the hypothetical ratio we 
multiplied the simulated ratio of the world monetary gold stock to the world money supply by the 
1928 ratio of world money supply to the monetary base. This calculation is based on the assump- 
tion that in  the absence of the Great Depression and its banking panics, the money supply multi- 
plier (MIH)  would not have declined as it did. 426  Michael D. Bordo and Barry Eichengreen 
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relative to the U.S. monetary gold stock, a point would be reached where the 
United States would be unable to  satisfy demands for conversion. Official 
holdings of  U.S.  dollars did in fact surpass the U.S. monetary gold stock in 
1965 (Bordo 1993, fig.  l.lO), leading the U.S.  government and Federal Re- 
serve System to adopt gold-conserving policies and to support the development 
of special drawing rights (SDRs; effectively a form of paper gold).42 
We  can use our simulations to see whether the Triffin problem would have 
also arisen under the hypothetical postwar gold exchange standard. Figure 
12.6, based on model A, depicts official holdings of dollars and monetary gold 
in the United States and the rest of the ~orld.4~  Starting with the actual 1950 
ratio of US. gold to total reserves, we allow this ratio to then move with the 
ratio of U.S. to world output.44 
Figure 12.6 shows that the U.S. monetary gold stock, rather than declining, 
42. Total foreign dollar holdings (both private and official) surpassed the U.S. monetary gold 
stock in 1960. 
43. We derived official dollar holdings by subtracting the simulated world monetary gold stock 
from simulated  international reserves to give us foreign exchange holdings. We then used the 
actual ratio of dollars to total foreign exchange to hack out dollars held by the rest of the world in 
the form of foreign exchange. This calculation assumes that sterling would have declined as a 
reserve asset under the postwar gold exchange standard much as it in fact did under Bretton Woods. 
44. To derive the U.S. monetary gold stock in 1950, we assumed that between  1929 and 1949 
the US.  monetary gold stock had the same share in the hypothetical world monetary gold stock 
as it did in fact. This presumes that the political factors that led to capital flight and gold flows in 
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Note: FE  = foreign exchange; ROW = rest of world. 
would have increased throughout the period, while the monetary gold stock of 
the rest of the world would have declined to zero in 1970. This result is driven 
by the fact that the demand for reserves increases faster than the demand for 
gold (that h(2) = 0.55), together with the fact that the demand for reserves by 
the United States (the reserve currency country) could be satisfied only by 
gold. The dollar balances of the rest of the world would have exceeded the U.S. 
monetary gold stock in 1955, pointing to the possibility of  a crisis at a rela- 
tively early date. 
Model B, based on actual trends in velocity, produces similar paths for mon- 
etary gold stocks, although the levels are somewhat higher, reflecting the inher- 
itance of a larger monetary gold stock from the interwar period (a consequence 
of  the extra deflation produced by the falling trend in velocity). This pushes 
the date of the confidence crisis out to 1959. Model C, based on endogenous 
velocity, presents a pattern similar to model A. Model D, the post-World  War 
I resumption scenario, reveals that dollar holdings would have surpassed the 
U.S. monetary gold stock in 1955, as in model A. 
In our final exercise in sensitivity analysis, we posit that European coun- 
tries postponed resumption until 1953 to better cope with the dollar shortage. 
This assumes that the inflow of Marshall aid would have sufficed at that point 
to provide the liquidity needed to start up the system. We label these simula- 
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entered the zone in which U.S. foreign monetary liabilities exceeded U.S. 
gold reserves.45 
One can imagine four possible scenarios once the world entered the “crisis 
zone” (in the words of  Kenen  1960) where foreign holdings of  dollars ex- 
ceeded the US. monetary gold stock. First, the gold exchange standard could 
have unraveled into a pure gold standard, as countries unwilling to shift to a 
pure gold exchange standard followed deflationary policies to restore their 
original gold reserves. We think this scenario is implausible. Just as the decline 
in the share of foreign exchange in global reserves from 37 percent to 11 per- 
cent between 1928 and 1931 aggravated the interwar problem of deflation and 
depression, ultimately leading countries to abandon the system, it is unlikely 
that they would have had more stomach for a deflationary crisis in the 1950s. 
Alternatively, in the face of an unraveling gold exchange standard, the major 
countries might have negotiated something like the Bretton Woods agreement. 
This would have involved creation of an institution like the IMF to provide a 
reserve asset as a substitute for dollars. Whether it would also have encouraged 
the use of capital controls and the adjustable peg is questionable. This would 
likely have  depended on whether our hypothetical gold exchange standard, 
when it was operating, induced asymmetric adjustment and destabilizing capi- 
tal flows as in the 1930s, or smooth adjustment and stabilizing capital move- 
ments as in the pre-1914 period. This in turn would reflect the credibility of 
commitment to gold convertibility. But we  are skeptical that an IMF would 
have been established absent the events of the 1930s but present the perception 
of events of the 1920s-the  perception that floating exchange rates led to de- 
stabilizing capital flows and the deflationary consequences of Britain’s return 
to gold at the original parity-since  in our hypothetical gold exchange stan- 
dard world the perceived problems associated with a gold exchange standard 
would not have materialized. 
Finally, the system could have been transformed into a pure dollar stan- 
dard. Some authors (e.g., McKinnon 1969; Meltzer 1991) posit that had the 
United States followed stable monetary policies under Bretton Woods-had 
it geared policy to the maintenance of price stability-the  gold-dollar stan- 
dard would have evolved into a pure dollar standard that could have lasted 
indefinitely. There  would  have been  no  “Triffin crisis”  because  countries 
other than the United States would have been willing to hold unlimited quan- 
tities of dollars. 
An examination of the composition of  countries’ gold reserves during the 
Bretton Woods period in fact suggests that most advanced countries, with the 
principal exceptions of Germany, Italy, and Japan, in fact strongly preferred to 
45. This is not surprising, since between 1950 and 1953 U.S. gold reserves had already begun 
their precipitous decline and, combined with the Marshall Plan aid and the Korean War inflation- 
induced balance-of-payments deficits, official outstanding dollar liabilities would have exceeded 
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hold gold throughout the 1950s and 1960s (see Kenen 1963; IMF 1972). To 
the extent that the preference for gold over interest-earning  dollar-denominated 
assets reflected memories of capital losses due to the devaluations of the 1930s 
(and not simply the monetary policies the United States followed in the 1960s), 
one could argue that, in our scenario of a preserved and restored gold exchange 
standard, this preference would have been less; absent the inflationary shocks 
of the Vietnam War and the shift to expansionary monetary policy, the system 
might have prevailed considerably longer than we suggest above.&  The count- 
erargument, which we find compelling, is that the preference of some coun- 
tries-notably  France-for  gold over foreign exchange reserves predated the 
Great Depression. France had begun converting its gold into foreign exchange 
as early as May  1927, more than two years before the onset of  the slump 
(Clarke 1967). The Bank of France relied heavily on reserve inflows and out- 
flows for balance-of-payments adjustment even before World War I (Bloom- 
field 1959), and the country’s experience with high inflation in the first half of 
the 1920s reinforced French officials’ commitment to the operation of a pure 
gold standard. It is unlikely that, in the absence of the depression, French poli- 
cymakers would have been more willing to hold foreign exchange re~erves.4~ 
Thus, as U.S. foreign monetary liabilities began to rise, countries like France 
with the strongest preference for gold over foreign exchange would have pre- 
sented the liabilities to the Federal Reserve for conversion (as they in fact did 
in the mid-1960s). This would have created a problem of collective action: 
other countries might have been willing to hold U.S.  monetary liabilities so 
long as the central banks and governments of  countries like France did the 
same, but once the latter showed a desire to convert their foreign exchange to 
gold, all the governments concerned had an incentive to get out of dollars be- 
fore U.S.  gold reserves were exhausted. Although the precise timing of the 
crisis remains difficult to pin down, the final denouement is the same. 
Following the collapse of the gold exchange standard, it is likely the world 
would have moved toward the managed float with capital mobility that we have 
today. Rather than attempt to create a world central bank and a new interna- 
tional monetary system, or to put up with a dollar standard, the major nations 
would have preferred cutting the link with gold and following independent 
financial policies. Given the problems associated with the above three options, 
we believe that this one would have been most likely. 
46. Indeed, in a world without the Great Depression and the aversion to deflation it spawned, 
the United States, as center country of the gold exchange standard, may have followed the type of 
monetary policy that Britain did when it was the center country of the classical gold standard-a 
policy of maintaining convertibility at any price. 
47. One can argue that the depth of the depression in France, which was itself perceived to have 
resulted from commitment to the maintenance of the gold standard (Mow5 1991,274-77),  worked 
to  weaken the  country’s preference for holding gold, which  would therefore  have  been even 
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12.4  Implications for Growth and Resource Allocation after World 
War I1 
Having established that the interwar gold standard would have persisted for 
the duration of  the 1930s and been resurrected after World War 11,  we now 
consider the implications of this arrangement for growth and resource alloca- 
tion. Perhaps the most important implication of the postwar international mon- 
etary system for resource allocation followed from the prevalence of capital 
controls, which were pervasive after the war but would have been absent under 
our counterfactual. 
12.4.1  The Problem 
We  assume that controls on capital and current account transactions would 
have  been  absent following a  relatively limited transitional period  on the 
grounds that these were incompatible with the operation of the gold standard. 
Freedom to convert currency and token coin, however obtained, into gold at 
the statutory rate and to import and export that gold was a keystone of the gold 
standard 
The question then becomes how the post-World  War  I1 world would have 
evolved in the absence of controls. Here it is important to distinguish between 
the early and not-so-early postwar periods. One reason is that data are more 
partial and less complete for the early postwar years. Only from the mid-1960s 
does the IMF begin providing quantitative indicators of the incidence of capital 
controls; comparable indices for earlier years (of our own construction) may 
be less reliable. Even for the advanced industrial countries, macroeconomic 
data for the immediate postwar years are incomplete. Data gaps are an even 
greater problem, of course, for developing countries, many of  which did not 
exist as independent states before the 1960s. 
While it unambiguously follows from our counterfactual that the early post- 
war period-say  through the 1950s-would  have been free of capital controls, 
it is not so clear how to characterize the subsequent counterfactual regime. Had 
the reconstructed gold exchange standard collapsed in, say, 1960 and countries 
accepted greater exchange rate flexibility, would that flexibility have been ac- 
companied by the imposition of  controls, as in the 1930s, or by the mainte- 
48. To be sure, central banks and governments used a variety of measures that resembled capital 
controls. They used the gold devices-paying  out clipped and worn coin, or accepting gold im- 
ports only at inland cities rather than at central bank offices located close to a port-as  a way of 
discouraging reserve inflows and outflows and mimicking some of the effects of controls. Even 
Britain, that most faithful adherent to the gold standard, had embargoed foreign lending in the 
second half of the 1920s. In the early 1930s  the United States, under the provisions of the Johnson 
Act, had prohibited lending to countries in default on their outstanding  debts. But notwithstanding 
these exceptions, the essence of the gold standard remained free international capital mobility. 
Most of the restrictions on capital flows imposed in the 1930s were adopted in response to the 
collapse of  the international monetary and financial system, an event that we assume away in 
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nance of open capital markets? For reasons given in section 12.3, we assume 
the latter and thus contrast the impact of the actual regime of current and capi- 
tal account restrictions with a counterfactual of open capital markets. 
The obvious hypothesis is that the absence of restrictions on international 
capital flows would have made for a more efficient allocation of resources and, 
ultimately, faster economic growth. Capital would have flowed from countries 
where it was abundant to those where it was scarce. The stimulus to investment 
and growth would have been most apparent in those countries on the receiving 
end, but a more efficient allocation of funds could also have redounded favor- 
ably on the creditor countries, insofar as they received a higher return on their 
investments and felt the favorable repercussions of higher growth worldwide. 
Financial repression that distorted the intersectoral allocation of resources and 
depressed domestic savings rates in the countries in which it was practiced 
would not have been possible in the face of open international financial mar- 
kets. Counterarguments include (1) that capital controls were never entirely 
effective and therefore that one should not expect to discern a large impact on 
economic outcomes and (2) that policies of industrial targeting, in East Asia 
for example, helped to solve coordination problems and internalize externali- 
ties that would have held back the growth process otherwise and that these 
interventions would not have been possible in the absence of  controls. The 
effect of controls on growth and resource allocation is ultimately an empiri- 
cal question. 
12.4.2  The Literature 
The literature contains two notable attempts to answer this question. Ales- 
ina, Grilli, and Milesi-Ferretti (1994) consider the experience of  20 industrial 
countries since 1950, relating a dummy variable for the presence or absence 
of  capital controls constructed from the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions to the accumulation of  public debt, 
the rate of inflation, the real interest rate, and the GDP growth rate. They find 
that countries with controls accumulate  more public debt, have lower real inter- 
est rates, and run higher inflation rates. This is consistent with the view that 
capital controls, by bottling up international financial flows, facilitate collec- 
tion of the inflation tax and reduce the costs of servicing the public debt. The 
implications for the rate of GDP growth are unclear: the authors find only a 
small and statistically insignificant impact of controls on the growth of GDP 
per capita. 
Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995) extend the analysis to a panel of 61 indus- 
trial and developing economies. They distinguish three measures of controls: 
restrictions on payments for capital transactions (as in Alesina et al. 1994); 
separate exchange rates for capital transactions or invisibles  (a proxy for multi- 
ple currency practices, which theory suggests should have much the same ef- 
fect as capital controls); and restrictions on payments for current transactions 
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ti0ns).4~  They too find that the presence of  capital controls, current account 
restrictions, and multiple exchange rate practices are associated with higher 
rates of inflation and lower real interest rates (where the analysis of real interest 
rates is limited to the industrial countries). There is some evidence that capital 
controls are positively associated with growth, while current account restric- 
tions are negatively associated, although neither correlation is robust. 
In this section we extend and reconsider this evidence. We  extend the data 
back from the mid-1960s to 1959, which is important given the focus of our 
counterfactual analysis. We consider intermediate variables linking controls to 
growth, such as the investment rate, the savings rate, and export growth. We 
control for problems of  unobserved heterogeneity. While Grilli and Milesi- 
Ferretti test for the endogeneity of capital controls and find that the results are 
little affected by this correction, our concern is different, namely, that countries 
with and without controls are not drawn from the same underlying popula- 
tion-that  they differ in ways that are difficult to observe. We implement an 
econometric correction for this problem. And we use principal components to 
construct a summary measure of the incidence of controls that removes some 
ambiguity about the effects of alternative measures. 
12.4.3  Methodology 
Governments impose controls when they believe the policy will achieve a 
desired end (such as reducing inflation or limiting external deficits). Hence, 
controls tend to be observed where they  are likely to have the largest effect. 
This creates problems of selectivity, in whose presence least squares estimation 
will deliver coefficient estimates of the average effect of such policies. 
To  obtain unbiased estimates we condition on the propensity score.5o  The 
effect we seek to measure is the difference in, say, the current account of  a 
particular country as a function of  whether it imposes capital controls. While 
we only have data on the current account balance associated with the policy 
that was  actually in  place, we  are interested in the counterfactual, in what 
would have happened had the other policy been followed. If  controls were 
imposed randomly, least squares would suffice. But countries with controls are 
not identical to countries that shun the policy. In the language of experimental 
design, we lack a control group that is otherwise identical to the treatment 
group. If xz  is a vector of factors determining the likelihood of capital controls, 
the joint distribution of x, for countries that have capital controls is different 
from the joint distribution for countries that do not. 
We address this problem by using the information in xt to sort countries in 
our sample by the likelihood of their adopting controls. We  form a subgroup 
49. As before, they consider the impact on inflation (excluding inflation rates above 80 percent 
per annum to prevent the results from being dominated by outliers), real interest rates, and per 
capita GDP growth. 
50. For a general treatment of  propensity score methods see Rosenbaum and Rubin  (1983, 
1984). For a related example in the economics literature, see Angrist (1995). 433  The Great Depression and the International Monetary System 
with  a similar likelihood of  imposing controls-with  a similar propensity 
score-and  compare the current accounts of countries with and without con- 
trols within that subgroup, thereby minimizing the bias owing to heteroge- 
neit~.~' 
In a small sample we are unlikely to have countries with identical propensity 
scores. Instead, we group the sample into quintiles, where the first group com- 
prises the 20 percent least likely to have controls, the last group the 20 percent 
most likely to have them. Within each of the five groups we then compare the 
current accounts of countries with and without 
The propensity of a country-year pair to have imposed any form of capital 
control (restrictions on payments for capital transactions, separate exchange 
rates for capital transactions or invisibles, and restrictions on payments for 
current transactions) is modeled as a function of  the number of  executive 
changes in the country from 1950 to 1982, the legal independence of the cen- 
tral bank, the average turnover rate of central bankers per year, a dummy indi- 
cating a majority coalition government is in power, a dummy indicating a left- 
of-center government is in power, a dummy indicating a fixed or managed 
exchange rate arrangement is in place, the log of real per capita GDP, and the 
following variables lagged one year: the ratio of the current account deficit to 
GDP, the ratio of government consumption to GDP, and the ratio of trade (the 
sum of imports and exports) to GDP. 
For each dependent variable six regressions are run. The first two include 
only industrialized countries, for which we have relatively few missing obser- 
vations. The first of these regressions has no controls for time or country ef- 
fects, while the second includes year controls. The next four regressions em- 
5  1. We  thus implement a logit model designed to predict whether capital controls are in place 
as a function of the components of x, and use the coefficients from this model to derive the fitted 
probability of a country's having capital controls in a given year. This fitted probability is the 
propensity score. The proposition underlying the methodology is that conditional on the estimated 
propensity score the joint distribution of  x, for countries with capital controls is identical to the 
joint distribution for countries without them. We  would like to take a group of countries with the 
same values of the x, vector and compare the current accounts of countries that imposed capital 
controls with the current accounts of those that did not. More generally, we can compare countries 
with the same value of some function of x,, say b(x,).  In the present context, b(x,)  is the propensity 
score estimated from the logit model. Comparing the current accounts of countries with the same 
value of b(xJ should then deliver unbiased estimates of the effect of capital controls. 
52. This comparison is undertaken using a standard least squares model with the current account 
(and other measures of economic policy and performance) as the dependent variable and the inde- 
pendent variables employed  by Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995). Since we are comparing countries 
with similar but not necessarily equal propensity scores, not all of  the bias will be eliminated. 
However, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1984) argue that this method is likely to remove some 90 percent 
of the bias due to heterogeneity.  Finally, to find the average effect of capital controls in the popula- 
tion, we take the average  of the five estimated coefficients  from the quintile  regressions. In comput- 
ing the standard error of  this average, we  assume the propensity score for each observation is 
measured without error, placing all observations in the correct quintile. Assuming that the coeffi- 
cients from the five quintiles are independent of each other, we can compute the standard error of 
the weighted average of coefficients using the simple formula for the variance of a weighted sum 
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ploy data for all countries in the sample, industrial and developing. The first 
has no time or year controls, the second has year controls, the third has country 
controls, and the last has country controls and includes the lagged value of the 
dependent variable as an additional regressor.53  The range of  years for each 
regression is 1959 to 1989.54  Each of these regressions includes the three alter- 
native measures of capital controls. In addition, however, we  use principal 
component methods to construct a single measure of controls from our three 
dummy variables. 
Each of the regressions includes as independent variables, in addition to the 
measures of capital controls, the log of  the level of real per capita GDP in 
1959, the ratio of government consumption to GDP, the ratio of trade to GDP, 
a dummy variable for nondemocracies, the average turnover rate of  central 
bankers, and an index of the legal independence of the central bank.55 
12.4.4  Results 
The full set of results is available from the authors on request. Here we 
summarize our principal findings. We concentrate on the regressions with no 
country or year controls (the reader should assume this except where stated to 
the contrary), although we  discuss the other results where the estimates are 
particularly sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of controls. 
The results in table 12.5 suggest that countries with controls run  signifi- 
cantly higher inflation. This is consistent with the notion that such countries 
limit capital mobility as a way of making more active use of the inflation tax.56 
For the industrial countries, most of the explanatory power appears to reside 
with the measure of capital account restrictions; for the developing countries, 
multiple currency practices are particularly important. According to the ordi- 
nary least squares (OLS) regressions on the full sample, both capital account 
restrictions and multiple currency practices affect inflation for the sample of 
both industrial and developing countries, but the correction for heterogeneity 
eliminates the first of these effects. 
While our heterogeneity correction does not much modify the overall con- 
clusions, there are some interesting differences from the OLS regressions. In 
53.  This last specification  is designed to mitigate autocorrelation  problems. 
54. While we would have liked to extend the data set back to 1953 or 1955 to coincide with the 
end of the counterfactual  transition period we describe above, this turns out to be difficult, as data 
constraints on our exercise become increasingly binding the further back we go. The year 1959 is 
quite close to the beginning of our counterfactual  period of  capital account convertibility, though. 
55. To  conserve space, we do not report the coefficients on these variables, which are broadly 
similar to those reported and discussed by Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995). The regressions for 
the real interest rate include also the average number of  executive changes per year, a dummy 
variable indicating that a left-wing government is in power, a dummy variable indicating that a 
coalition government is in power, and the lagged value ofthe  ratio of the government budget deficit 
to GDP. 
56. Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995) note the possibility that capital controls, by enlarging the 
inflation tax base, may cause the optimal rate of inflation to fall, but they find the same positive 
coefficient on a more limited sample. Table 12.5  Effect of Capital Controls on Inflation: Ordinary Least Squares and Heterogeneity-Corrected Estimates 
Subsample Regressions by Quintile  Average of 
Full  Subsample 
Variable  Sample  t-Statistic  1  2  3  4  5  Regressions  r-Statistic 
A. Inflation Rate, Industrial Countries Only 
Capital account restrictions 
Current account restrictions 





Capital account restrictions 
Current account restrictions 



































3.504  1.977 





3.849  2.072 
(1.107)  (0.722) 
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B. Inflation Rate, All Countries 
0.996  5.670  -1.243 
(1.155)  (1.662)  (2.090) 
7.445  0.501  3.092 
(1.818)  (1.786)  (1.694) 
6.629  2.932  4.371 
(1.984)  (1.670)  (1.519) 
5.114  5.217  3.874 

































2.602  2.873 
(0.906) 
-0.213  -0.295 
(0.772) 
-0.625  -0.732 
(0.854) 
2.43 1  3.204 
(0.759) 
0.987  0.961 
(1.026) 
0.802  0.883 
(0.909) 
4.730  5.468 
(0.865) 
2.430  3.341 
(0.727) 
Notes: S.E. = standard error of regression. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 436  Michael D. Bordo and Barry Eichengreen 
the industrial countries, capital account restrictions are significantly associated 
with inflation only for the first and second quintiles (those countries least likely 
to have controls). An interpretation is that in industrial countries most likely to 
impose controls, market participants discovered means of  evading them and 
that only where controls were unexpected did they have major effects. 
These results are likely to be important for economic activity if they affect 
relative prices. Consider, for example, the (ex post) real interest rate on govern- 
ment bonds. Like Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995), we find that capital controls 
are associated with significantly lower real interest rates, as if countries used 
controls to bottle up financial capital domestically (table 12.6). In the equa- 
tions not corrected for heterogeneity, all three measures of controls border on 
statistical significance at conventional levels, and all enter negati~ely.~’ 
Insofar as controls are associated with significantly lower real interest rates, 
we might expect investment rates to be higher. This is what we  find for the 
industrial countries (table 12.7),  although different kinds of controls seem to 
have different effects. Capital account restrictions are associated with higher 
investment rates, while current account restrictions and multiple currency prac- 
tices have the opposite effect.58  For the full sample including developing coun- 
tries, the signs are the same but the net effect is negative, since the depressing 
impact of current account restrictions and multiple currency practices is larger. 
An interpretation is that capital account restrictions worked to channel domes- 
tic savings into domestic investment, but current account restrictions increased 
the shadow price of  imported capital goods and reduced the marginal effi- 
ciency of investment. It makes sense that these last effects should be largest in 
developing countries. 
We can explore this hypothesis further by looking at the determinants of the 
current account as a share of GDP (since domestic saving is the sum of invest- 
ment, considered above, plus the current account). For the industrial countries, 
the regression with no country or year dummies suggests that all three mea- 
sures of  capital controls have a statistically significant effect on the current 
account (table 12.8). Capital account restrictions enter with the largest coeffi- 
cient and negative sign (in the OLS regression), and the summary measure of 
capital controls suggests that these worked to depress the current account sur- 
plus and, by implication, domestic saving. The OLS results for the full sample 
similarly indicate a negative effect of capital account restrictions, but signifi- 
cance is eliminated by the correction for heterogeneity. While the evidence is 
57. However, the heterogeneity correction eliminates the effect of current account restrictions 
and multiple currency practices in the equations for industrial countries, and that for current ac- 
count restrictions in the equation for the full sample of industrial and developing economies. This 
is notable insofar as Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995) lay considerable stress on the current account 
restrictions variable, which they interpret as a proxy for the extent of financial repression and the 
intensity of capital conuols. 
58. The effect of the latter is eliminated by the correction for heterogeneity. Table 12.6  Effect of Capital Controls on Real Interest Rates: Ordinary Least Squares and Heterogeneity-Corrected Estimates 
Variable 
Average of 
Full  Subsample 
Subsample Regressions by Quintile 
Sample  t-Statistic  1  2  3  4  5  Regressions  t-Statistic 
Capital account restrictions  -2.25  1 
(0.359) 
Current account restrictions  -  1.260 
(0.435) 
Multiple currency practices  -0.728 
(0.424) 
(0.329) 
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-3.530  -4.625 
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-2.580  -4.922 
Capital account restrictions  -2.659 
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B. Real Interest Rate, All Countries 
-5.026  -1.985  -0.943  0.948 
(0.745)  (0.757)  (1.092) 
(0.915)  (0.803) 
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(0.831)  (0.649)  (0.923) 
-2.263  -0.238  -0.481 
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-  1.289 
-2.142 
-5.232 
-3.777  -3.345 
-0.728  -1.130 
(1.129) 
(0.644) 
-3.985  -4.835 
(0.824) 
(0.822) 
-2.674  -3.253 
Nores:  S.E. = standard error of regression. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Table 12.7  Effect of  Capital Controls on Investment: Ordinary Least Squares and Heterogeneity-Corrected Estimates 
Subsample Regressions by Quintile  Average of 
Full  Subsample 
Variable  Sample  t-Statistic  1  2  3  4  5  Regressions  t-Statistic 
Capital account restrictions  3.837 
Current account restrictions  -  1.485 
(0.394) 
(0.450) 
Multiple currency practices  -1.143 
(0.496) 








A. Investment as a Fraction of  GDP, Industrial Countries 
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(0.497) 
Multiple current practices  -2.060 
(0.443) 
Principal component  -0.980 
(0.351) 







B. Investment as a Fraction of GDP, All Countries 
6.131  2.677  4.147  3.952 
(0.731)  (0.895)  (1.089) 
(1.117)  (0.892)  (0.943) 
(1.110)  (0.808)  (0.898) 
(0.603)  (0.676)  (0.783) 
-7.674  -4.924  -2.585  -6.159 
-4.650  -1.196  -1.360  -0.580 
-2.792  -0.216  0.766  -2.441 
1.215 















3.770  6.287 
(0.600) 
-4.380  -8.011 
(0.547) 
-  1.969  -4.290 
(0.459) 
(0.396) 
-1.135  -2.866 
Notes: S.E. = standard error of regression. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Table 12.8  Effect of Capital Controls on Current Account: Ordinary Least Squares and Heterogeneity-Corrected  Estimates 
Variable 
Subsample Regressions by  Quintile  Average of 
Full  Subsample 
Sample  t-Statistic  1  2  3  4  5  Regressions  r-Statistic 
Capital account restrictions  -  1.782 
(0.278) 
Current account restrictions  0.282 
(0.319) 
Multiple currency practices  1.151 
(0.350) 
(0.250) 







A. Current Account as a Fraction of  GDP, Industrial Countries 
-6.410  -1.390  -1.153  0.611  -1.474 
(0.692)  (0.447)  (0.789)  (1.532) 
0.884  2.113  1.114  -0.461 
(0.694)  (0.647)  (0.607) 
3.289  1.510  0.720  1.462 
(0.643)  (0.694)  (1.008) 
-5.452  -1.526  -0.118  1.605  -1.816 









-1.187  -2.526 
1.068  2.752 





-1.162  -2.820 
Capital account restrictions  -0.673 





Multiple current practices  -0.048 







B. Current Account as a Fraction of GDP, All Countries 
-1.917  -1.693  -1.763  -2.290  0.561 
(0.564)  (0.550)  (0.772)  (0.866) 
1.287  0.408  1.188  1.031  -0.152 
(0.866)  (0.586)  (0.615)  (0.654) 
(0.884)  (0.532)  (0.577)  (0.665) 
-0.717  -0.639  -0.333  -0.222  -0.009 
(0.493)  (0.422)  (0.512)  (0.617) 









0.03 1  0.070 
(0.436) 
0.232  0.618 
(0.375) 
0.322  0.941 
(0.342) 
-0.051  -0.183 
(0.279) 
Notes:  S.E. = standard error of regression. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 440  Michael D. Bordo and Barry Eichengreen 
not robust, it is consistent with the interpretation of the effect of controls on 
savings, investment, and capital formation offered above. 
Exports were the other engine of  growth according to most studies of the 
post-World  War TI growth process.59  We  find little evidence that the growth of 
exports (in constant dollars) was affected by capital controls (table 12.9).  The 
basic regression for the industrial countries, with and without corrections for 
heterogeneity, suggests a small positive effect of  multiple currency practices, 
but the measures of capital controls are consistently insignificant as a group, 
and the addition of year and country controls eliminates even the multiple cur- 
rency regime effect. The same is true for the full sample including the devel- 
oping countries: while there are some sign reversals on the individual  measures 
of  controls, our three capital control proxies as a group have no significant 
impact on export growth. 
Our regressions for the industrial countries show little effect on economic 
growth (table 12.10). The basic regression with no year or country controls 
suggests that capital account restrictions had a small, statistically significant, 
positive effect on growth. The quintile regressions suggest that this effect is 
concentrated mainly in countries relatively unlikely to have controls. But the 
three measures of controls are insignificant as a group, and the addition of year 
effects eliminates even that impact. 
Interestingly, the effects on growth of  our three measures of controls have 
the opposite sign when the sample includes also developing countries. This 
result is driven by  a larger (negative) effect of  multiple currency practices, 
which-the  quintile regressions correcting for heterogeneity suggest-sig- 
nificantly depress growth in these countries. On balance, our three measures 
of controls just border on significance at conventional confidence levels when 
the industrial and developing countries are combined. 
12.4.5  Summary of Results 
Our results tell a consistent story. They suggest that controls had a signifi- 
cant effect on international financial flows and were associated with higher 
inflation and lower ex post real interest rates. Lower interest rates were associ- 
ated with higher domestic investment but discouraged saving. Additional in- 
vestment did not translate into faster economic growth, however, due perhaps 
to the higher cost of imported capital goods associated with current account 
restrictions and a lower marginal efficiency of investment. There is some evi- 
dence that current account restrictions and multiple currency practices tended 
to depress growth in developing countries, although the effect is marginal sta- 
tistically and economically. 
These results suggest that the greater international capital mobility associ- 
59. These studies tend to  disagree about whether investment and exports were dual engines 
of  growth (as in Eichengreen's 1996 model of the advanced industrial countries), whether rising 
investment induced the increase in exports (as in Rodrik's 1995 model of  the East Asian growth 
miracle), or whether exports induced the rise in investment (as in models of export-led growth). Table 12.9  Effect of Capital Controls on Growth of Exports: Ordinary Least Squares and Heterogeneity-Corrected Estimates 
Subsample Regressions by Quintile  Average of 
Full  Subsample 
Variable  Sample  &Statistic  1  2  3  4  5  Regressions  t-Statistic 
Capital account restrictions  0.026 
(0.009) 
(0.011) 
Multiple currency practices  0.034 
(0.012) 
Principal component  0.016 
(0.008) 







A. Growth Rate of  Exports, Industrial Countries 
2.811  -0.043  0.039  -0.013 
(0.029)  (0.017)  (0.031) 
-1.604  -0.034  0.004 
(0.027)  (0.025) 
2.873  0.049  0.027 
(0.025)  (0.027) 
1.956  -0.047  0.038  0.006 

















0.020  1.101 
(0.018) 
-0.020  -1.384 
(0.014) 
0.039  2.325 
(0.017) 
-0.005  -0.339 
(0.015) 
Capital account restrictions  0.017 
(0.015) 
(0.015) 
Multiple current practices  -0.032 
(0.014) 
Principal component  -0.014 








B. Growth Rate of Exports, All Countries 
1.133  0.004  0.028  0.029 
(0.017)  (0.021)  (0.032) 
-  1.746  0.004  -0.036  -0.027 
(0.026)  (0.022)  (0.026) 
-2.338  -0.055  0.012  -0.008 
(0.026)  (0.020)  (0.024) 
-1.321  -0.004  0.001  -0.008 

















0.03  1  1.504 
(0.021) 
-0.023  1.376 
(0.017) 
-0.139  -2.617 
(0.015) 
(0.013) 
-0.013  -0.990 
Notes:  S.E. = standard error of  regression. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Table  12.10  Effect of Capital Controls on Economic Growth: Ordinary Least Squares and Heterogeneity-Corrected  Estimates 
Variable 
Subsample Regressions by  Quintile  Average of 
Full  Subsample 
Sample  &Statistic  1  2  3  4  5  Regressions  t-Statistic 
Capital account restrictions  0.007 
(0.003) 
Current account restrictions  -0.009 
(0.003) 
Multiple currency practices  0.004 
(0.004) 








A. Growth Rate of  Real Per Capita GDP, Industrial Countries 
2.273  0.006  0.013  0.019  0.034 
(0.009)  (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.022) 
-2.576  -0.001  0.008  -0.018 
(0.009)  (0.007)  (0.009) 
1.226  0.010  -0.001  -0.002 
(0.009)  (0.007)  (0.014) 
0.870  0.006  0.014  0.019  -0.007 





















Capital account restrictions  0.007 
(0.004) 
Current account restrictions  -0.011 
(0.004) 
Multiple current practices  -0.009 
(0.004) 








B. Growth Rate of  Real Per Capita GDP, All Countries 
1.72  1  0.005  0.013  0.015  0.004 
(0.006)  (0.006)  (0.012)  (0.010) 
-2.698  -0.019  -0.012  -0.006  -0.007 
(0.106)  (0.006)  (0.010)  (0.009) 
(0.009)  (0.006)  (0.009)  (0.008) 
-  1.776  -0.009  0.002  -0.006  -0.004 
(0.005)  (0.004)  (0.008)  (0.007) 









0.003  0.648 
(0.005) 




-0.010  -2.499 
-0.006  -  1.955 
Notes; S.E. = standard error of  regression. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors 443  The Great Depression and the International Monetary System 
ated with a post-World  War I1 gold exchange standard would not have much 
affected the rate of economic growth. The literature features two interpreta- 
tions of the connections between capital mobility and growth. In one, the post- 
war growth process (especially in developing countries) had to be initiated 
by  government interventions to boost savings and investment rates and solve 
coordination problems. In the other, such interventions depressed the effi- 
ciency with which savings and investment were deployed. Our results suggest 
that the two effects canceled out in the industrial countries, while the latter 
may  have depressed the rate of economic growth on balance in  the devel- 
oping world. 
12.5  Implications for Institution Building and 
International Cooperation 
A final implication  of the depression for the development of the international 
monetary system concerns the institutions of international monetary coopera- 
tion, specifically the IMF. The design of  the Bretton Woods institutions was 
powerfully shaped by the experience of the 1930s: Keynes, White, and their 
colleagues sought a structure that would prevent any recurrence of the interna- 
tional monetary instability of that decade. In addition to providing for capital 
controls and parity adjustments in the event of a fundamental disequilibrium, 
they established the IMF to oversee the operation of  their new international 
system. 
Had the interwar gold standard operated smoothly up to the outbreak of 
World War 11, there would have been no comparable impetus to establish Bret- 
ton Woods-like  institutions thereafter. The post-World  War I1 gold exchange 
standard would have operated without an IMF to provide exceptional liquidity, 
apply policy conditionality, and encourage international cooperation. 
The question is how much difference the Fund’s absence would have made. 
One conceivable answer is “not very much.” The interwar gold exchange stan- 
dard operated without the support of a comparable institution, and our count- 
erfactual analysis is predicated on the assumption that this system functioned 
smoothly throughout the 1920s and 1930s without the supervision of an inter- 
national monetary institution. If so, why should the 1950s have been different? 
They would have been different, first of all, because of the problem of col- 
lective action posed by  the Tkiffin dilemma. As we saw in section 12.3, the 
supply of monetary gold was sufficient after World War I for the interwar gold 
standard to operate through the end of the 1930s, assuming the absence of the 
Great Depression,  without the official foreign liabilities of the principal reserve 
currency country, the United States, ever exceeding America’s holdings of 
monetary gold. No problem of  collective action would have arisen in which 
other countries had to agree not to cash in their dollar reserves, since there was 
no question of the convertibility of  those dollars into gold. In the 1950s, in 
contrast, the wartime rise in the price level and the rapid postwar growth of the 444  Michael D. Bordo and Barry Eichengreen 
world economy would have so augmented the demand for international re- 
serves that U.S. official foreign liabilities would have quickly come to exceed 
the country’s gold reserves had a dollar-based gold exchange standard been 
restored in the aftermath of  the war.  Countries holding dollars as reserves 
would have continued to do so willingly only if  they were confident of  the 
equal willingness of others. This same problem existed under Bretton Woods, 
of course, although it brought down that system of pegged but adjustable ex- 
change rates only later. One explanation for the lag, and for the length of the 
interlude of relative stability that preceded it, is that the IMF provided a partial 
solution to the problem of collective action. The Fund offered a forum for the 
exchange of information and opinion among governments; as in models of 
“cheap talk,” this helped to facilitate cooperation. The Fund assembled infor- 
mation on central bank policies and monitored international financial transac- 
tions, limiting the incentive for governments to renege on their agreement to 
cooperate by  increasing the likelihood of  rapid detection. There is reason to 
think that the Bretton Woods system would have been brought down even ear- 
lier by the Triffin dilemma had there been no IMF. It follows that the absence 
of  an IMF-like entity in our postwar gold exchange standard scenario would 
have brought Triffin’s chickens home to roost even sooner. 
There are also other, related grounds for arguing that the absence of  the 
Fund would have weakened the operation of  our hypothetical postwar gold 
exchange standard. The IMF played a role under Bretton Woods in lending to 
countries experiencing exceptional balance-of-payments difficulties. Its loans 
helped such countries accommodate temporary shocks without having to aban- 
don their Bretton Woods pegs. No comparable institution existed in the in- 
terwar period, of  course, and when the 1931 financial crisis struck the gold 
exchange standard, countries had to negotiate foreign financial assistance gov- 
ernment to government, on an ad hoc, bilateral basis. The absence of estab- 
lished procedures for the extension of such loans and the inevitable politiciza- 
tion of the intergovernmental  process hindered extension of the requisite loans. 
France hesitated to assist Germany, for example, because Berlin had reportedly 
concluded a customs union agreement with Austria in violation of  the Ver- 
sailles Treaty and because of the belief that Germany was secretly rearming. 
One can imagine that political and diplomatic obstacles would have similarly 
arisen in the 1950s and 1960s  had balance-of-payments loans had to be negoti- 
ated on an ad hoc basis directly between governments. It is thus likely that the 
extension of balance-of-payments support for post-World  War I1 currencies in 
distress would have been less in the absence of the Fund. 
The absence of IMF lending would have been felt most strongly by smaller 
countries of  less consequence for the stability of  the international monetary 
system-by  the countries and currencies of least concern to the major indus- 
trial powers who would have been least likely to receive exceptional bilateral 
support. One can think of instances to the contrary where the advanced indus- 
trial countries have provided financial support for the currency of  a smaller, 
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Communaut6 Financikre Africaine (CFA) countries in 1995 are recent cases in 
point. But in both instances the larger country was galvanized into action by 
exceptional circumstances: in the case of the United States by Mexico’s geo- 
graphical proximity, by  the need to support the North American Free Trade 
Agreement and by Mexico’s status as a benchmark for emerging market invest- 
ors; in the case of the CFA by France’s long-standing colonial ties with the 
region and Paris’s foreign policy ambitions. In many other instances where 
the Fund has provided balance-of-payments support, the advanced industrial 
countries presumably would not have bothered. Hence, the absence of an IMF- 
like entity under our no-depression counterfactual would have had negative 
consequences for  the external financial support that  such countries could 
expect. 
The Fund has encouraged adjustment in developing countries through its 
policy conditionality as well, making the negotiation of a mutually acceptable 
adjustment package a prerequisite for the disbursal of  finance. Dominguez 
(1993) argues that the IMF has functioned as a commitment technology, using 
its funds and stature to promote course corrections and lock in policy reform. 
Rodrik (1996) and Gilbert et al. (1996) similarly argue that multilateral  lending 
by the IMF and the World Bank has carried out a function that intergovernmen- 
tal lending could not. Not only did the IMF and the World Bank provide moni- 
toring and signaling services and threaten sanctions if policy went awry, but 
the markets had reason to believe that, because the Ih4F’s own purse was at 
risk, it would take its information-gathering and monitoring functions seri- 
ously. And because the policy conditionality that served as a commitment de- 
vice was applied by a multilateral  agency one step removed from national capi- 
tals, this intervention in national affairs was more politically palatable. One 
can argue that policy reform in developing countries would have proceeded 
more slowly after World War I1 in the absence of the Fund. 
Initiatives  to coordinate macroeconomic  policies internationally  were hardly 
pervasive under Bretton Woods, but it is likely that they would have been even 
less frequent and less successful after World War I1 had there been no IMF. 
Policy coordination must overcome costs of assembling and evaluating infor- 
mation, negotiating mutually acceptable course corrections, and monitoring 
countries’ compliance with the terms of their agreement. An international  insti- 
tution can facilitate this process in a number of ways. Because information is 
a nonrival good, an international institution can presumably assemble it at 
reduced cost; the role of the IMF in  gathering and publishing balance-of- 
payments and government finance statistics can be thought of in this light. As- 
sessing cross-border spillovers of policy can be thought of as a central function 
of IMF surveillance.  The institutionalized exchange of information and views 
can facilitate the formation of a consensus. The regular meetings of the IMF 
Executive Board provide precedents and shape agendas, delineating the policy 
domain that is fair game for discussion. Staff analyses provide terms of refer- 
ence, statistics provided in background reports serve as focal points directing 
officials toward pressing policy problems, and the written record and institu- 446  Michael D. Bordo and Barry Eichengreen 
tional memory of  staff lend continuity to a process that would otherwise be 
disrupted by changes in government and cabinet composition. 
The absence of the IMF would thus have dealt a setback to efforts to coordi- 
nate policies after World War 11.  The failure of  interwar monetary and eco- 
nomic conferences at Brussels in 1920, Genoa in 1922, and London in 1933, 
where attempts were made to coordinate policies without the mediation of an 
international institution, lends support to this view. It suggests that macroeco- 
nomic policy coordination would have been minimal, due to in part to the ab- 
sence of the Fund, under our postwar gold exchange standard, as it had been 
in the second part of the 1920s. 
If  no IMF  had been created after World War 11,  perhaps another, already 
existing institution would have stepped in to fill the void. The obvious candi- 
date is the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), established in  1930 to 
oversee the transfer of  German reparations. The BIS never played a leading 
role in the management of the post-World War I1 international economic order. 
In part this role was usurped by the IMF, but in part the legitimacy of the BIS 
was damaged by  its inability to mount a concerted response to the financial 
crises of the early 1930s, events that would not have occurred in our count- 
erfactual. Yet  the fact that the BIS was involved in the reparations dispute and 
that it was accused of  abetting the Nazis during World War II led a number of 
Western countries to oppose granting it a more prominent role (and, in the case 
of the Dutch, to actively plump for its abolition). This makes it unlikely that 
the BIS would have filled the opening left by the absence of the IMF. 
12.6  Conclusion 
How would the international monetary system have evolved in the absence 
of the Great Depression? Our conclusion is that the depression interrupted but 
did not permanently alter the development of international monetary arrange- 
ments. As a result of the international monetary instability of the 1930s-the 
unsatisfactory experience with output instability, hot money flows, exchange 
rate variability, and beggar-thy-neighbor policies-the  depression prompted 
the construction of a very different post-World  War I1 monetary and financial 
regime characterized by  pegged but adjustable exchange rates, highly regu- 
lated domestic financial markets, and pervasive controls on international capi- 
tal flows. The gradual recovery of domestic and international financial transac- 
tions from the disruptions of  depression and war eventually resulted in the 
growing porousness of controls, mounting difficulties with operating pegged 
but adjustable rates, and ultimately the collapse of the Bretton Woods system 
in 1971. In the absence of the depression, this interlude of pegged but adjust- 
able rates and restrictions on capital mobility would not have occurred; the 
perception that the interwar gold standard had functioned reasonably smoothly 
in the 1920s and 1930s would have encouraged the restoration of  similar ar- 
rangements after World War  11. The postwar international monetary system 447  The Great Depression and the International Monetary System 
would have been characterized  by very infrequent parity changes and high cap- 
ital mobility. The world would have experienced mild deflation in the 1930s 
and after the war, in contrast to the actual roller coaster of sharp deflation and 
inflation in the 1930s and secular inflation in the 1950s and 1960s. 
But the same factors that brought down the Bretton Woods  system-the 
failure of  the flow supply of gold to match the bouyant growth of the world 
economy and hence of governments’ demands for international reserves, lead- 
ing to an overhang of U.S. official foreign liabilities and questions about the 
convertibility of the dollar into gold-would  have brought down this hypothet- 
ical postwar gold exchange standard as well, and probably at an earlier date. 
In the absence of the Great Depression, there would have been little impetus 
for the creation of  an organization like the IMF, and there would have been 
little institutionalization of  international monetary cooperation. Under these 
conditions, the problems of collective action that had to be solved to success- 
fully navigate the transition from the gold exchange standard to a dollar stan- 
dard would have been insurmountable.  The most likely scenario  for subsequent 
events would have been a transition to freer floating. Somewhat to our own 
surprise, we conclude that the depression slowed but did not permanently alter 
the development of the international  monetary system; it only delayed the tran- 
sition to the kind of system with which we live today. 
How much of a difference this change in timing made for the development 
of  the world economy is difficult to say. The connections between financial 
arrangements and economic growth are among the most difficult for econo- 
mists to analyze; it is not surprising that our findings on this question are less 
than clearcut. Our best guess is that freer capital mobility in the wake of World 
War I1 would have had little effect on economic growth in the advanced indus- 
trial countries, across which capital-labor ratios and productivity did not differ 
greatly, but that it would have permitted a more efficient allocation of resources 
in the developing world, accelerating at least slightly the process of economic 
growth and development there. 
The Great Depression was a watershed in many respects, as the other chap- 
ters in this volume show. But so far as the long-term development of the inter- 
national monetary system is concerned, it may have made less of a difference 
than is commonly supposed. 
Appendix A 
Data Sources 
Part I: Data Sources for Initial Values 
The first part of this appendix explains how the initial values given in table 
12.2 and used in the simulations were created and gives the sources. 448  Michael D. Bordo and Barry Eichengreen 
Values for the 1928-38  Simulation 
Prices: Calculated as a GDP-weighted average for the following countries: 
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Chile, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Gerniany, 
Greece, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, and United States. GDP weights, price 
indexes, and exchange rates versus U.S. dollars are from the Bordo-Schwartz 
database; see Bordo and Schwartz (1  996). 
Nominal GDP: Same source as prices. 
Money supply, M2: Same source as prices. 
Money base: Notes and coins in circulation plus central bank deposits from 
League  of  Nations, Monthly Bulletin of  Statistics  (Geneva,  1932-39)  and 
Mitchell (1992, 1993, 1995). 
International reserves: “Gold and Foreign Reserves,” in League of Nations, 
Statistical Yearbook (Geneva, 1926, 193  1-32,  1940-41). 
Central bank gold reserves: Same source as international reserves. 
Gold production: World gold production from U.S. Gold Commission Re- 
World monetary gold stock: Same source as gold production. 
World nonmonetary gold stock: Same source as gold production. 
Interest  rate:  US. short-term interest  rate  (three  months) from  Bordo- 
port (1982). 
Schwartz database; see Bordo and Schwartz (1996). 
Assumed growth rates in the simulation period. Real GDP: 3.9 percent, from 
Bordo and Schwartz (1996). 
Velocity: -2.6  percent, from Bordo and Schwartz (1996). 
Productivity:  1.8 percent,  from  Kendrick (1961, tables A-XXII  and A- 
XXV). 
Assumptions for 1938-50 
Assumed growth rates in the simulation period. Monetary gold stock: 2.7 per- 
cent, from US.  Gold Commission Report (1982). 
Productivity: 2.0 percent, from Kendrick (1961, table 3-3). 
Values for the 1950-71 Simulation 
Prices: Calculated as a GDP-weighted average for the following countries: 
Australia, Belgium, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
Switzerland, France, Norway, Sweden, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, United 
Kingdom, and United States. GDP weights, price indexes, and exchange rates 
versus U.S.  dollars are from the Bordo-Schwartz database; see Bordo and 
Schwartz (1996). 
Nominal GDP: Same source as prices. 
Money supply, M2: Same source as prices. 
International reserves: IMF (1972). 
Central bank gold reserves: IMF (1972). 449  The Great Depression and the International Monetary System 
High-powered money: IMF (1972). 
IMF quota: IMF (1972). 
SDRs (1970-71 only): IMF (1972). 
Gold production: World gold production from U.S. Gold Commission Re- 
World monetary gold stock Same source as gold production. 
World nonmonetary gold stock: Same source as gold production. 
Interest rate: U.S. short-term interest rate (three months). 
port (1982). 
Assumed growth rates in the simulation period. Real GDP: 4.4 percent, from 
Bordo and Schwartz (1996). 
Velocity: 0.3 percent, from Bordo and Schwartz (1996). 
Productivity: 2.2 percent, from Kendrick (1973, table 3-3). 
Part 11: Data Sources for the Capital Control Regressions 
The data on capital and current account restrictions, multiple currency prac- 
tices, and exchange rate arrangements are from elaborations on IMF, Annual 
Report on Exchange Rate Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (various 
issues). Capital account restrictions are defined as “restrictions on payment on 
capital transactions.” Current account restrictions are defined as “restrictions 
on payments for current transactions.” Multiple currency practices are defined 
as “separate exchange rate(s) for some or all capital transactions and/or some 
or all invisibles.” 
Data on the inflation rate, nominal interest rates on government debt, the 
ratio of the current account deficit to GDP, annual exports measured in U.S. 
dollars, and the ratio of the government budget deficit to GDP are from IMF, 
International Financial Statistics (various issues), and national sources. The 
inflation rate is the annual rate of change of the consumer price index. The real 
ex post interest rate on government debt is the nominal rate less actual inflation. 
Data on the growth rate of real per capita GDP, the ratio of government 
consumption to GDP, the ratio of investment to GDP, and the ratio of the sum 
of imports and exports to GDP are from Summers and Heston (1991) and Penn 
World Table 5.5 update. 
The index of legal central bank independence and the average yearly turn- 
over rate of  central bankers are from Cukierman et al. (1992). Higher values 
of the index of central bank independence correspond to more bank indepen- 
dence. 
Dummy variables indicating a coalition government is in power, a majority 
government is in power, a left-of-center government is in power, and a nondem- 
ocratic government is  in  power  are from elaborations on  Banks  (various 
issues). 
Data on the number of government changes between 1950 and 1982 is from 
Taylor and Jodice (1983). 450  Michael D. Bordo and Barry Eichengreen 
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